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Abstract
This article argues that the Chinese state has more highly articulated policies to deal with
social disturbance than previously recognized by specialists. It does so by highlighting and
critically analyzing the policies followed to improve the opportunities for migrant worker
representation. The state has adopted a three-pronged policy. It has improved migrant worker
rights, encouraged the official unions to help enforce these rights and allowed NGOs to offer
certain services. The official unions are encouraged to adopt a legal watchdog role by a
combination of legislation and limited external organizational competition. We argue that the
dynamic of organizational competition is a previously unrecognized factor in moving China in a
'socialist corporatist' direction.
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 INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper presents a new perspective on Chinese state policy towards the 
representation of migrant workers, a large, economically significant and distinct 
group within the Chinese working class. The central questions addressed are how 
far the state is attempting to encourage more representative institutions to emerge 
and what this implies for characterisations of Chinese ‘corporatism’. We draw on 
existing industrial relations and NGO literature, and examine the terms of 
legislation to approach the issue. The answers help broaden our understanding of, 
and help us characterise, the ruling élite’s strategy for dealing with social 
discontent.       
The early stages of industrialisation, viewed in international historical 
perspective, have frequently caused massive social dislocation and internal 
migration, bringing enormous social unrest frequently encompassing 
revolutionary political elements (Thompson, 1991). In the Chinese case, social 
disruption has been huge and migrant workers today number in excess of 200 
million (Chinese National Statistics Bureau 2009). Migration from villages to 
large cities such as Beijing, Shanghai, Guangdong and Shenzhen has fuelled the 
rapid pace of economic growth (Liu, 2007: 78-81). Contemporary collective 
disturbance by migrants stands in a centuries-long tradition of popular revolt and 
occurs in the context of a subservient and largely ineffective trade union 
movement (Arrighi, 2009). The current financial crisis threatens further unrest as 
laid-off workers are often unable to return to their villages.  
It has been posited (Petras, 2006) that the élite’s central response to these 
disturbances has been to increase social spending. Others have focused on the 
state’s repressive activity (China Labour Bulletin, 2008c). A third strand of 
analysis addresses potential changes in representative bodies. This has 
concentrated on the extent of trade unions’ ‘corporatist transformation’ (Chan, 
2006) while a closely associated stream of research has drawn attention to the re-
shaping of civil society through the expansion of popular associations (Unger and 
Chan, 2008).   
The latter schools of thought suggest that the much-disputed ‘corporatist’ 
term (Wiarda, 1996) is most appropriate to characterise developments. 
‘Corporatism’, as used in this context, stresses the organic nature of society and, 
in the common Chinese term, the need to ‘harmonise’ different social interests. It 
therefore emphasises the way that all organisations are subject to strict political 
control.  Corporatism may vary in the extent to which it is ‘state’ or ‘societal’, that 
is, in the degree to which it is driven and supported by institutions from above or 
below. These researchers address the extent to which the state’s political 
domination is being eased by a shift towards ‘societal’ corporatism whereby 
associations in civil society play an increasing role (Chan, 2006, Unger and Chan, 
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 2008). Might there be a gradual move from a ‘state-dominated form of 
corporatism’ to a ‘societal’ variant in which an increasing representational 
function is performed by associations? If so, this shift in emphasis might go some 
way to refuting Dickson’s (2003) contrary arguments emphasising the ‘Leninist’ 
nature of the Chinese state. Stressing the essentially centralist nature of this 
political tradition, Dickson took the view that political dominance and repression 
severely limit the possibilities for any such shift.  We address this theoretical 
debate. 
We analyse the ways that the state is seeking to re-shape its interactions 
with civil society in one important area, primarily by focusing on the legal and 
other measures taken by the government to diffuse and channel discontent. We 
adopt an historical-institutionalist approach that focuses on the dynamic 
interactions between the state, markets, workers and the key institutions of 
employee representation (Gospel, 2005). Our main lines of argument are that the 
Chinese state has tried to allay migrant worker unrest by improving their rights 
and, in particular, has provided safe channels for them to voice their problems. 
We show that, in part, these channels take the form of individual legal 
mechanisms, but unions are also encouraged to undertake collective bargaining. In 
addition, the state has permitted a degree of external (albeit very limited) 
competition from NGOs across several of the unions’ functions. Overall, therefore, 
it has strengthened the position of those within the ossified official unions who 
argue for change. They have done so in three ways: by legislating for the rights of 
migrant workers, by increasing the scope of the official unions’ remit, and last but 
not least, by permitting an element of organisational competition.   
The article is structured as follows.  First, the position of migrant workers 
as a distinctive segment of the working class is sketched.  Next, the ways in which 
the Chinese state has legislated to improve their treatment and encouraged the 
official unions to take a more representative role in relation to them is analysed. 
We then examine the role played by NGOs in providing a range of services to 
migrant workers. Finally, we conclude by discussing the significance of current 
state policy.     
 
MIGRANT WORKERS: A SPECIFIC SEGMENT OF THE WORKING 
CLASS  
 
Migrant workers in China have suffered from profound and particular problems, 
making them a super-exploited segment of the working class.  They were long not 
considered part of the proletariat by the Chinese Communist Party, but were 
rather defined by their peasant origins. This ideological definition was 
institutionalised in a distinctive labour régime: the ‘hukou’ registration system, 
initially implemented to restrict agricultural labour mobility, while ensuring an 
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 adequate supply of labour to state enterprises and providing enhanced surveillance 
possibilities. Registration records officially identify a person as a resident of a 
particular area and contain information such as his or her name, date of birth, the 
names of family members, and if married, those of spouses. Neither individuals 
nor families can move outside their localities without first obtaining permission 
from the authorities. The number of people allowed to do so has been tightly 
regulated; those who moved without permission lost their entitlement to food 
rations, housing or medical care and could be forcibly removed. Workers 
migrating from rural areas thus cannot transfer their residence status when they 
move, preventing them from settling and integrating into urban life. Their 
citizenship status is thereby undermined – despite living in cities, they are not 
entitled to urban citizenship, the right to settle, nor regular jobs or social benefits 
such as subsidised housing, pension or healthcare.1 Unregistered workers could be 
forcibly removed to their villages of origin.  
The registration system remains largely intact though migrant workers 
can now, subject to certain criteria, apply for permanent or temporary residency 
status in the cities (China Labour Bulletin, 2008a). Currently, the legitimacy of 
their presence in cities remains contested, cutting them off from the rights enjoyed 
by urban workers and weakening them greatly in the employment relationship 
(Florence, 2006).  Many are illiterate in terms of their ability to understand written 
documents. Even if aware of their rights, they are reluctant to claim them because 
they are liable to be dismissed by their employers and replaced from the abundant 
supply of other workers seeking jobs. 
Suffering from low status and often with only limited skills, many are 
employed in poorly paid, labour intensive jobs such as construction and low-
skilled manufacturing (Wang, 2006). They frequently work without employment 
contracts and do not enjoy even the formal protection offered by these (rest 
periods, sickness benefits, maternity rights and rights against unfair dismissal). 
They experience exceptionally high rates of occupational diseases and workplace 
injuries, particularly in its notoriously dangerous coal mining industry (China 
Labour Bulletin 2008b). Migrant workers also suffer disproportionately from poor 
physical health, stress and depression (Wong & Song, 2008). Their access to state 
aid such as medical and healthcare facilities and social security is extremely 
limited. Employers frequently delay the payment of wages to them, giving rise to 
wage arrears. Many local state authorities require them to pay a range of 
                                                          
1 The hukou system has been the subject of considerable debate, concerning its continuing viability 
under current circumstances. See e.g. Liu, ZQ (2005) “Institution and Inequality: The Hukou 
System in China” Journal of Comparative Economics, 33, 1, pp. 133 – 157, Wang, FL (2004) 
“Reformed Migration Control and New Targeted People: China’s Hukou System in the 2000s,” 
The China Quarterly, 177, pp.115 – 132 and Wang, FL (2005) Organising Through Division and 
Exclusion: China’s Hukou System, (Stanford California: Stanford University Press). 
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 supplementary taxes – city improvement fees, labour adjustment fees, fees for 
issuing temporary residence cards, employment cards, work permits and fees to 
enable their children to attend schools in urban areas. They also often turn a blind 
eye to the way such workers are treated, more intent on securing the cooperation 
of employers from whom they derive revenue (Gallagher, 2004; Zhang, 2008).  In 
short, they are a group exhibiting serious and very specific problems.  
The separateness of migrant workers has extended to their representation 
as employees since they have traditionally been denied union membership, 
previously limited to urban workers. Employers discourage them from developing 
a collective identity (Human Rights Watch, 2008: 47, 55). Consequently, no 
legitimate institutional vehicles have existed for the expression of their discontent. 
They have had no ways of raising their problems other than individual resistance 
on the one hand and strikes and public protest action on the other. They have also 
not been able to enforce their rights through a formal employment contract – a 
2006 survey into forty cities conducted by the Ministry of Labor showed that only 
12.5% of migrant workers had signed a labor contract (Chan, 2009). Further, Gu, 
Zheng & Yi (2007) discuss China’s “urban diseases” caused by migration; large 
numbers of migrants and a high degree of concentration, low levels of collective 
action, marginality in social status, unfair treatment and difficulty experienced by 
migrant workers in integrating into cities. Those frustrated with their plight 
employ a range of methods ranging from sit-ins, to wildcat strikes, pickets and 
rioting (Shen, 2008: 163 – 165). ‘Mass incidents’ involving migrants occur daily, 
although many are unreported in the media.  
Many violent actions have occurred, threatening social and political 
stability (Li, 2005; Beijing Review, 2009).2 The official number of strikes rose to 
almost 100, 000 in 2005, of which an unknown but probably large number 
involved migrant workers. The media continues to report incidents of strikes and 
protests by migrant workers and indeed, they have been closely identified with 
social unrest (Kahn, 2006; Parameswaran, 2008; McCartney, 2009).  
In recent years, the state, alarmed by high levels of civil disturbance, has 
increasingly specified certain rights and attempted to extend individual worker 
representation by the official unions. It has also introduced various formal 
measures to enable migrant workers to claim equal entitlements to employment 
rights and social protection, thereby attempting to reduce the gap between their 
experience and that of other workers.  In this way, it is hoped to reduce their 
specific sense of grievance and collective identity as excluded workers.  Moreover, 
                                                          
2 Labour arbitration departments in Beijing handled 32,954 labor disputes in the first nine months 
of 2008, up 104% from the same period in 2007. Courts in Beijing handled 12,140 first-instance 
labor dispute cases, up 90% from the same period in 2007. It was estimated that the average 
annual increase in legal labour disputes was 17% in recent years, but had rocketed to 170% in 
2008 (Beijing Review, 2009). 
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 by providing individual legal ways of addressing problems, the collective actions 
may become less frequent and virulent. We now turn to a consideration of these. 
 
REGULATING THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP 
 
Chinese workers are in an increasingly market position. Previously, the official 
ideology was that workers were ‘masters of the enterprise’, contributing to a 
radiant future for all. There was no difference between the interests of enterprise 
managers and workers, because under communist ideology, all helped fulfil the 
mission of the party state. Since the initiation of market based reform in the late 
1970s, however, the situation has shifted. Labour has been more fully 
commodified, with the ‘iron rice bowl’ being replaced by labour contracts (Ngok, 
2008: 45). The privatisation of state owned enterprises from the 1990s also saw 
more and more power being given to management to determine labour practices 
within the firm (Gallagher, 2004).    
Legal regulation of the employment relationship is a relatively recent 
phenomenon in China, introduced only after changes in the labour market. The 
late 1980s and early 1990s saw increasing fragmentation of labour relations in the 
country, due to rapid economic growth based on the ‘market economy’ model and 
the impact of ongoing attempts to privatise state owned enterprises. More workers 
fell outside the old labour regime, becoming subject instead, to the forces of 
supply and demand. Indeed, in 1992, the government under the premiership of 
Deng Xiaoping accepted the ‘market economy’ system as the ultimate goal of 
economic reform. For the first time, the concept of developing a labour market 
was put forward, as was the need to develop a framework to regulate the 
relationship among the key players in the market (CCPCC, 1992;3 Ngok, 2008; 
Josephs, 2007).  
The Labour Law 1994 was the first comprehensive statute to stipulate 
minimum workplace standards, regulating aspects of employment ranging from 
recruitment, termination of employment, payment of wages, work hours, overtime, 
rest periods and dispute resolution. However, it was drafted in a broad brush way, 
without detailed clarification of its various provisions, and therefore offered 
employers great discretion in the way it was implemented (Wang, Appelbaum, 
Degiuli & Lichtenstein, 2009: 486). Benefitting from an abundant labour supply, 
many employers simply refused employees contracts specifying their legal rights 
since they had few difficulties in recruiting workers. Moreover, since both 
enforcement mechanisms and employee representation were almost non-existent, 
the terms of the 1994 law were often unobserved. Most significantly, the Act did 
not recognise migrant workers as workers and conferred no rights upon them, 
                                                          
3 The Decision on Some Issues on the Establishment of a Socialist Market Economic Structure, 
1992. 
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 causing them to be exploited. Unsurprisingly, the number of strikes and protests 
grew rapidly, attracting criticism from the media and international human rights 
groups (Ngok, 2008: 53-57). 
In 2003, the new leadership, Hu Jintao & Wen Jiabao, announced that 
‘social stability’, ‘social justice’ and ‘plight of the underprivileged’ were primary 
concerns in their attempt to create a more ‘harmonious society’.  Migrant workers 
were recognised as a special category of employees deserving additional 
protection and several regulations were enacted to alleviate their position. ‘The 
Circular on Good Management and Provision of Services for Rural Migrant 
Workers 2003’ required local authorities to abolish discriminatory treatment of 
migrant workers and provide them with equal access to education, employment 
and public services. The ‘Circular to the Ministry of Construction and Other 
Departments on Further Resolving the Problem of Unpaid Wages in the 
Construction Industry 2004’ ordered local governments to pay all outstanding 
wages to migrant workers at their construction sites within three years, and urged 
courts to speed up the processing of unpaid wages. The ‘Circular on Further 
Improving the Working Conditions of Rural Migrant Workers 2004’ required 
local governments to simplify the application process for migrant workers in 
search of work. Last but not least, the ‘Opinion on Resolving the Problems faced 
by Migrant Workers 2006’ urged local governments to improve migrant workers’ 
access to social services. The latest Five Year Plan (2006 – 2010) to ‘construct a 
harmonious society with social balance’ 4  emphasised the state’s intention to 
ensure the use of labour contracts, protect workers’ legal rights, build proper 
dispute resolution mechanisms and make sure laws are implemented properly (Wu, 
2005).  
Labour laws were also enacted. The most recent, the Labour Contract 
Law 2007, stipulated rules for the regulation of the employment relationship, 
creating stringent requirements for employers to follow. It prescribed when 
workers could be dismissed (e.g. Articles 21, 44, 48, 87) and introduced 
requirements regarding work hours, rest and leave, wages and social insurance 
(e.g. Articles 4, 17, 51). Despite drawing opposition from the American Chamber 
of Commerce in Shanghai, the US-China Business Council and the European 
Union Chamber of Commerce in China on the basis that it would increase costs, 
over-regulate business relationships and would be very difficult to enforce, the 
government persisted in enacting it.5 It moved to finalise the Act following the 
                                                          
4 See ‘Communique of the Sixth Plenum of the 16th CPC Central Committee, at  
< http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-10/11/content_5191071.htm > 
5 This did not prevent companies from continuing to protest against the Act after it came into 
effect, however. Chan (2009) recounts the actions of Zhang Yin (CEO of the biggest papermaker 
in mainland China ‘Nine Dragons’ as well as a politician) who warned against the Act allowing a 
return to the old Maoist, socialist system of “iron rice bowl”  (permanent employment)—only two 
months after the law came into effect. She was also forthright in her view that from the perspective 
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 public outcry in June 2007 over slave labour conditions in the brick industry in 
the Shanxi province. Rural migrant workers were kidnapped, sold to brick 
factories and forced to work long hours with no pay. Subsequent investigations 
revealed that more than 2,000 brick kilns were operating without licenses and had 
“illegally” employed 53,000 workers. The case was regarded as symbolic of a 
lack of workers’ rights in China. Within weeks, January 1, 2008 was set as the 
date for the Act’s implementation.6 
Simultaneously, anti-discrimination legislation was elaborated.  The 
Employment Promotion Law 2007, which also came into force in January 2008, 
prohibited various discriminatory practices.  Many of the prohibitions in the new 
Act already appeared in the Labour Law 1994, but were never effectively 
enforced. The 2007 Law provides that employees cannot be discriminated against 
on the basis of their ethnicity, race, gender, religious belief, age, physical 
disability or disease (Article 3; Articles 25 – 30). For the first time, the Act 
prohibits discrimination against migrant workers by providing that those who seek 
employment in cities must be given the same rights as those of urban workers 
(Article 31).  A new central government department, the Department of Migrant 
Workers’ Affairs, was set up in 2008.  
Yet the chronically weak enforcement of laws in China continues to 
allow migrant worker super-exploitation. Two reasons for the weak enforcement 
of law may be given. First, the distinction between ‘policy’ and ‘law’ is 
conceptually problematic in China – it was not until recently that the ‘rule of law’ 
was recognised as a crucial tool with which to regulate the key players in the 
market – previously, under an interventionist state, few laws existed. Instead, it 
was more usual to rely on administrative orders, decrees, rules and notices enacted 
by the NPC, State Council and other governmental agencies. Although latterly 
many labour regulations have been enacted, they are still very much considered as 
‘policy’ rather than ‘law’ – they take the form of directives from the state and are 
of an administrative, rather than legal, nature. Often drafted in a broad brush basis, 
they lack the detail and clarity needed to assist their enforcement. Rather than 
creating rights which can be used against employers, these regulations are often 
drafted in a propagandistic sense. They are also enforced by local governments 
rather than the courts and only when conditions for law making matured, were 
labour regulations converted into ‘law’ (Ngok, 2008: 49). Thus China’s 
‘…written law is slowly coming abreast of that in developed countries…’ 
(Josephs, 2008: 374). 
                                                                                                                                                            
of development, China would not become strong and affluent if the disparity between the rich and 
the poor did not exist, and if the law overprotected labour, enterprises could not operate 
efficiently.” The union, perhaps not surprisingly, sided with the company. 
6 C Divjak, “China enacts new labour law amid rising discontent” at 
<http://www.wsws.org/articles/2008/feb2008/clab-f06.shtml> . 
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 Secondly, fundamental flaws exist in the legal channels for enforcing the 
law. Cooney (2007) discusses this in detail, pointing out that laws are often 
ignored by the very persons responsible for implementing them – ie. local state 
authorities, which are more interested in generating income from employers and 
which are reluctant to antagonise them by forcing them to comply with the law. 
Evidence suggests that despite central government blandishments, regulations are 
being implemented by local government in a way which maintains rather than 
reduces the discrimination and inequality suffered by migrant workers, in order to 
restrict their migration into large cities (Davies & Ramia, 20087). Collusion 
between state officials and employers further weakens the law’s potential to 
protect workers (Gallagher, 2004: 23, 36). Official inspections by authorities 
remain sporadic and superficial because of a shortage of inspectors. The range of 
penalties is also very limited – local labour authorities can only issue warnings, 
correction notices, fines and compensation orders. They cannot, for example, 
order a business to close, seize its earnings or detain its owners. In order to do this, 
they must seek the assistance of other state bodies, such as the police. However, 
the latter are very reluctant to intervene (Cooney, 2007: 678). Many employers 
have attempted to circumvent their legal obligations. Huawei Technologies, 
China’s largest telecommunication equipment manufacturer, asked 7,000 workers 
with more than eight years of service to resign and accept re-employment as 
‘new’ staff in order to convert ‘long-term contracted’ staff to ‘short-term 
contracted’ staff – taking itself out of the reach of the new laws. Businesses have 
abandoned factories in order to avoid paying wages, companies have relocated to 
other south east Asian countries where labour contracts are regulated even less 
strictly and smaller companies, unable to bear the costs of compliance, have made 
workers redundant (Lan, 2009: 512 – 513).  Extensive evidence exists of 
employer violation of the Labour Contract Law (see for example ITUC/GUF 
Hong Kong Liaison Office 2008).  
Consequently, we do not suggest that the enactment of law may be seen 
as a real change in practice in society but rather argue that changes in the rhetoric 
of government are occurring.  It is clear that worker rights continue to be 
inadequately observed, largely because no effective system of enforcement exists, 
underlining the continuing lack of effective worker representation.   
The continued specificity of migrant workers’ problems entails 
organisational proximity to their constituency and specific expertise on the part of 
any body wishing to assist them. Significantly, the first organisations to react on a 
                                                          
7 The authors conducted research into how central government regulations (which required local 
government to lift residential restrictions, provide social security and employment related services 
and enable access to education by migrant children) were being implemented by local government. 
The authors argue that without adequate funding for governance reform, local governments will 
continue to manipulate central regulations to maintain the status quo. 
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 large scale to the unrest of the early Twenty First Century were NGOs which 
sprang up in the regions and whose work we detail below, rather than the official 
trade unions. Some NGOs had already been formed by the end of the Twentieth 
Century, and moved into the space left by the official unions’ inactivity (He & 
Huang, 2008).   
 
THE ACFTU 
 
The official Chinese union, the All China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), 
is an integral part of the state regulatory apparatus (Taylor & Li, 2007). It is 
regarded as a state instrument to curb dissent and dissipate conflicts. Its 
representative monopoly was for many years emphatically enforced. The 
formation of independent unions is strictly prohibited under the law8 and attempts 
by workers to organise or form independent unions have been suppressed (Han, 
2005; Munro, 2006;9 ITUC, 2008). Though there have been sporadic attempts by 
union activists to assert the ACFTU’s independence from the state, these have 
either lost momentum or failed (Chan, 2006: 277, 288). Indeed, Howell (2006) 
questioned the prospect of the ACFTU recreating itself to become a genuine 
representative for Chinese workers and concluded that this would only occur if it 
was able to extricate itself from the state party. At present, this prospect is 
unlikely.  
The ACFTU represents the largest bloc of union members in the world, 
but it is not recognised as independent by the international trade union movement 
(Croucher & Cotton, 2009).  Protection of workers’ rights is regarded by the state 
as subordinate to the overall goals of social and political stability; the unions are 
‘transmission belts’ for the Communist Party’s ideas. The ACFTU’s subservience 
to the state in political terms and lack of track record in representing workers are 
both evident; key union positions are allocated by the Communist Party. Under 
classic communist rule, trade unions had several functions. These were to 
mobilise workers for labour production, to administer welfare (giving rise to the 
possibility of exercising discipline over workers by withholding it), to organise 
recreation, to act as political advocates within the official apparatus and finally to 
protect workers’ rights and interests essentially through their role as legal 
watchdogs. Since it views itself as an extension of the state, the ACFTU avoids 
adversarial stances in dealing with employers, preferring instead to build 
‘harmony’. In many instances, union officials in enterprises are appointed by the 
employer, rather than democratically elected by workers. Zhu (2004) and Chan 
                                                          
8 Article 10 of the Trade Union Law 2001 
9 Munro (2006) discusses how the state has retaliated against dissidents by forcing them into 
psychiatric hospitals against their will. 
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 (2006, 2008) are among many scholars who argue that Chinese trade unions, 
limited by current constraints, cannot meet workers’ representational needs. 
Making significant changes in structures, functions and ways of working 
has been notoriously difficult for unions in most countries, focused as they are on 
reacting to initiatives by employers and the state rather than on more pro-active 
approaches. International experience shows that structural and formal changes, 
though themselves not easy to bring about, are easier to achieve than more 
profound cultural shifts, especially those that include adopting new 
representational functions (Hannigan, 1998; Croucher, 2000). In China, two 
additional factors militate against the possibility of unions fulfilling even the legal 
functions specified in legislation, that is, political control by party officials and 
the continued close relationship between local authorities and enterprises. Local 
government has also been criticised as bureaucratic, ineffectual and elitist, 
preferring to take employers’ rather than migrant workers’ part (Zhu, 2004: 1026; 
Taylor & Li, 2008: 703 – 704). Change is further hampered by the lack of power 
and autonomy of union officials themselves in representing workers, management 
domination of unions and the low levels of awareness among workers of the 
possible functions of workplace unions (Gallagher, 2004). 
In the last decade, however, practices have shifted somewhat in some 
localities. Workers have been allowed to, on occasion, directly elect their union 
leaders at enterprise level, though they are provided with ‘advice’ from the 
ACFTU when doing so. In the 1990s, many local unions in economically 
developed provinces such as Guangdong and Fujian, experimented with 
democratic elections (Howell, 2006). The preparatory work for direct elections in 
itself raises awareness about union functions and their potential to improve their 
rights (Chan 200710). Such elections had potential for creating a more accountable, 
worker-responsive and dynamic leadership, but did not in fact feed into more 
effective representative practices by the ACFTU on any widespread basis.  
With NGOs already beginning to emerge to fill this representation gap, 
the state enacted legislation to try to induce the ACFTU to fulfil and extend its 
activities. The Trade Union Law 2001 envisaged a more proactive role for the 
ACFTU in protecting workers’ rights. Its formal terms essentially reminded the 
ACFTU of its tasks: to be involved in drafting and enforcing collective contracts 
(Article 20), investigate abuses of labour rights (Article 25), direct employers to 
improve health and safety at work, require rectification when employers violated 
the law (Article 22), exercise their right to be consulted in the revision of labour 
laws and provide legal services to workers (Article 33). Rights to collective 
bargaining are however, notably absent in this statute.  
                                                          
10  The author discusses the encouragement experienced by workers during the Wal Mart 
unionisation process by the ACFTU, which galvanised them into both spreading the word and 
joining unions at Wal Mart branches. 
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 The Labour Contract Law 2007 envisaged a more ‘progressive’ role for 
the ACFTU, such as requiring it to conclude and police contracts with the 
employer (Article 6), giving it consultation rights on redundancy and rights to 
make legal challenges to changes to contracts made by the employer (Articles 
41&43) and conclude collective contracts on behalf of workers relating to 
remuneration, hours of work, holidays, health and safety, social insurance and 
welfare (Article 51). A degree of collective involvement by workers themselves is 
also envisaged here since the draft of the collective contract is to be presented to a 
meeting of workers. Article 51 further envisages representation in hitherto non-
unionised workplaces through representatives elected by workers albeit on the 
‘advice’ of the next highest level of the ACFTU. Article 56 encourages increased 
collective bargaining on distributive issues, providing that unions must oversee 
the collective rights of workers through legal channels. Article 78 obliges the 
union to ‘assist’ workers when they apply for arbitration or commence legal 
action against employers. Overall, the Act clearly pushes the ACFTU towards a 
more active defence of workers’ interests and allows for a degree of worker 
involvement. It unambiguously tries to move the ACFTU more fully to fulfil its 
legal watchdog role and, additionally, to exercise a representative role by 
supporting workers bringing individual arbitration and legal cases.   
Migrant workers were historically excluded from union membership, 
since they were not urban workers. The State Council’s ‘Circular on the 
Improvement of the Services and Management of Migrant Workers 2003’ 
represented an historic step because for the first time, migrant workers became 
eligible to join the ACFTU, whether at their employing units, employment 
services agencies or home towns. In 2003, the ACFTU started to bring them into 
the union’s purview for the first time, in response to the legislation. While the 
process of bringing them into membership is not a classical Western ‘organising’ 
one, but normally involves obtaining management agreement, it remains a 
symbolic step forward since it publicly demonstrates that they are now, for the 
first time, recognised as members of China’s working class.11 By early 2008, 
according to official figures, some 66 million migrant workers had been brought 
into the union. 12  In addition, again in response to policy, the ACFTU has 
recognised ‘neighbourhood or community unions’ within its structures– allowing 
migrant workers in small enterprises in the same neighbourhood to be recruited to 
the union.  In the past, they could only be brought into unions in the enterprise 
                                                          
11  China Daily (2003) “Union accepts migrant workers” (3 September 2003) 
<http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2003-09/03/content_260707.htm> (accessed 1 October 
2008) 
12 Trade Unions to Target Migrant Workers, CHINA DAILY, July 2, 2007, 
http://www.china.org.cn/english/China/198600.htm ; More than 66 Million Migrant Workers Join 
Trade Unions, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Oct. 14, 2008, at <http://en.chinagate.cn/news/2008-
10/14/content_16611431.htm>. 
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 which employed them (Pan, 2007). This measure has created a more inclusive 
basis for membership since it allows workers even in small workplaces to be 
represented. From 2003 the ACFTU claimed to have become more proactive in 
defending migrant workers (ACFTU, 2007). However, the historic exclusion of 
migrant workers from ACFTU membership is likely to mean that they would have 
had no experience or tradition of extracting benefits from it.  
The ACFTU has unionised foreign-owned and private enterprises even in 
the face of employer opposition. It recently succeeded in requiring Wal-Mart, Dell 
and Kodak – all heavily opposed to Chinese trade unionism—to allow the 
establishment of trade unions in their units in China (Chan, 2007). The 
unionisation of Wal-Mart in the summer of 2006 was an important symbolic 
victory for the ACFTU since it occurred in the face of the world’s largest 
employer, although the level of democratic involvement from workers has been 
the subject of some controversy. The reality at workplace level has been much 
discussed; it appears that despite initial euphoria among workers over their 
success in setting up ‘grass roots’ unions at the Wal-Mart branch in Quanzhou, the 
establishment of unions at its other superstores subsequently have been dominated 
by management and influenced by the business-friendly approach of the state, 
thus hampering their ability to act independently (Chan, 2007). 
The ACFTU recently also announced that it would pursue ten measures 
to ensure migrant workers’ legal rights (200613). These included helping local 
state authorities promote the use of labour contracts, working to establish a 
prompt payment system in the construction industry so that workers receive their 
wages in a timely fashion, strengthening occupational health and safety education 
among migrant workers and providing them with free legal assistance and other 
benefits. Thus, at the rhetorical level at least, the ACFTU reaffirmed its legal 
watchdog role. Yet this role remains seriously under-developed, especially in 
migrant workers’ view. Drawing on over 500 interviews conducted in state owned 
enterprises in 2007 in the auto industry in Hubei Province, Nichols & Zhao (2010) 
found extensive disaffection among workers with the ACFTU because they did 
not feel it represented their interests. 
The wider reality for Chinese workers’ representation remains one of 
ACFTU ineffectiveness. It is argued by the Hong Kong based China Labour 
Bulletin that the ACFTU remains ‘...essentially a charitable organisation, 
providing assistance only after workers’ rights have been violated’, and that it is 
‘...reactive rather than proactive; it only reacts within the bounds prescribed by 
the government, and only when the government instructs it to do so. The ACFTU 
is stuck in a rut, overly dependent on the Party and government, and cut off from 
the workers it is supposed to represent...’ (China Labour Bulletin, 2009: 33). 
                                                          
13 ACFTU, “Protection Measures for Migrants” 30 March 2006, at  
< http://www.acftu.org.cn/template/10002/file.jsp?cid=28&aid=267 > . 
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 Whether the ACFTU is likely to change is a question which is becoming more 
pertinent. With China’s accession to the World Trade Organisation and its 
signature of various ILO conventions, this question will be raised. Labour issues 
will constitute part of China’s international trade and political relations and no 
longer simply be regarded as domestic issues (Zhu & Warner, 2005: 359). 
Overall, therefore, while the state’s policy of trying to build the ACFTU 
as a means of mediating and moderating violent and volatile manifestations of 
social unrest has brought some results, their scope has been limited. While the 
state has taken action to promote action on the part of the ACFTU, the latter has 
made only small moves. Consequently, the ACFTU, it has been suggested, may 
only ‘play a minor role in helping to soften the blow for workers, exactly the role 
the State wants it to play in a period of radical economic reform’(Chan, 2006: 
285). Unsurprisingly, workers seldom express confidence in the ability of unions 
to represent their interests. For the state, this raises both the possibility and the 
spectre of an alternative in the form of strengthened collective self-organisation. 
We now turn to examine the role of NGOs since this offers the state some 
possibilities of minimising this possibility whilst simultaneously running the risk 
of helping it develop. Therefore their activities, though not generally suppressed, 
are subject to strong state control.  
 
NGOS AND MIGRANT WORKERS 
 
Over the last fifteen years, large numbers of migrant worker NGOs have emerged, 
many founded by migrant workers themselves. Zhang (2008) suggests that an 
attitude developed among migrant workers that they must become self-reliant, 
because neither trade unions nor the state would help them. They have developed 
a collective self-consciousness and awareness of the need to act on their own 
behalf that reflects their specific situation. A tendency towards increased migrant 
worker self-activity has become evident.  In the Pearl River Delta, for example, it 
has been estimated that there are over 500 ‘citizens’ advocates’ or ‘barefoot 
lawyers’, themselves migrant workers, who represent their fellows in disputes 
with employers (China Labour Bulletin 2008d). This tendency has been important 
background to the development of NGOs, part of a wider civil rights movement to 
protect the rights of the exploited in China (Greenwood-Bentley, 2004; Edele, 
2005; Liu, 2006; Beja, 2006). Links with global NGOs and international labour 
and human rights organisations have generated valuable resources and 
opportunities, providing a further impetus for their growth (Huang & Guo, 2006). 
At one level, NGOs provide safe representative possibilities in line with 
government policy, but at another, they potentially offer a more threatening 
prospect. Given wider Asian experience, including in Hong Kong, in which 
migrants’ issues have linked to wider democratic battles and NGOs have been 
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 able to draw on external links to further expand the democratic space, these 
developments give the élite cause for concern (Nomura, 2007; Lai, 2008).    
It is impossible to tell how many Chinese NGOs exist, although the 
World Bank (2009) estimates that they exceed 1 million. The term covers a wide 
range of organisations – from government-operated non governmental 
organisations (GONGOs) to non governmental organisations (NGOs) which do 
not enjoy state financial support (Wang & Liu, 2009: 6 – 7, 26 – 27). GONGOs 
are established by the state to deal with social problems and are by definition 
generally closely linked to the government. The state tolerates NGOs as long as 
they do not focus on politically motivated issues, particularly where they provide 
services to their constituents (poverty alleviation, elderly care, services for the 
disabled, youth development, rural development). The government continues to 
view NGOs as ‘bridges’ between the state and society and expect them to function 
as ‘helpful assistants’ in delivering services to society. Outside of these functions 
however, political control over them remains tight. 
 
NGO FUNCTIONS  
 
NGOs in China are not allowed to engage in overtly political activities, for fear 
that labour rights movements will threaten social harmony and stir up unrest 
among workers. Where migrant workers set up informal institutions of self-
representation, they have been unable to assert themselves with employers 
because of their unofficial nature (Gallagher, 2004: 34).  NGOs must thus find 
acceptable methods when trying to influence policy and their actions must take 
place in a space determined by the state. They have no right to make demands on 
the state, improve its structure and functioning or hold state officials accountable. 
This differs from their counterparts in advanced and developed countries who can 
demand governmental resources, participate in policy making and monitor state 
officials (Tang & Zhan, 200814). Unlike those in the west, Chinese NGOs are not 
a legally protected form of organisation (Salmenkari, 2009). In the main, like the 
ACFTU, they also only help minimise social conflict and orientate reforms in a 
way which helps the state maintain legitimacy (Froissart: 2006: 213).  
Nevertheless, there are NGOs which have attempted to go further to 
champion the rights of migrant workers, for example, by putting pressure on state 
authorities to set up programmes to benefit migrants, highlighting their plight by 
liaising with the media and mobilising public participation to influence the 
formation of pro-migrant public policies. They have also acted as legal 
representatives of migrant workers, advising them of their rights, assisting them in 
preparing legal documents and taking their cases through the legal system 
                                                          
14 The authors contrast the capacity of Chinese NGOs with those in the developed western world 
and highlight the hurdles faced by the former. 
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 (Greenwood-Bentley, 2004; Froissart, 2006; Halegua, 2008, He & Huang, 2008). 
The very activity of bringing legal cases to enforce rights may pave the way for 
further development towards open and collective action.  
It is therefore notable that the NGOs have in fact exercised a certain 
political role, albeit one that has avoided invoking possibilities of collective action. 
So for example, The Peking University Legal Aid Centre for Women recently 
addressed the concerns surrounding rural women’s land rights. Many rural women, 
if they owned land, had to forego their ownership of the land once they married 
and left their villages. The Centre raised public awareness of the issue and has 
campaigned for new laws to be introduced to protect women’s land rights.15 
Halegua (2008) recounts the services provided by ‘Little Bird’ NGO in Beijing in 
representing large numbers of migrant workers in settling labour disputes (the 
majority of these concern the non payment of wages) with their employers 
through persuasion and mediation. ‘Little Bird’ helps migrants, inter alia by 
establishing links with the media, government bureaux and lawyers. More than 
100 lawyers are currently registered with this NGO, which enhances its ability to 
advise migrant workers and prepare their cases. Officials from government 
bureaux are invited to intervene in labour disputes and in the mediation process. 
Finally, the media are engaged to highlight reprehensible practices by employers. 
This has been especially in evidence among those NGOs established outside the 
mainland.  Thus, the Hong-Kong based SACOM, formed in 2005, has been 
extremely active in investigating and publicising abuses especially by foreign 
companies (SACOM, 2010).   
In addition, many migrant worker NGOs fulfill a further apparently 
innocuous but also potentially ‘dangerous’ role.  Most of the NGOs surveyed by 
He & Huang (2008) provided cultural and recreational opportunities for migrant 
workers free of charge. The significance of these activities is considerable. 
Migrant workers, cut off from their villages and families live in a world in which 
recreation is largely absent. Opportunities for them to associate together and enjoy 
themselves through karaoke evenings and other social activities are greatly valued. 
This social role has historically been one of the most important functions carried 
out by the ACFTU. Nissen and Jarley (2005) suggest that such activities can build 
associative links between workers that may be the basis for mutual support and 
collective action. This associative building of social capital may be used both for 
workers to support each other through the rigours of legal cases and also for 
collective action. Thus, there is a high level of overlap between the ACFTU and 
the NGOs in at least three important areas: legal services, political activity and 
recreation.  
                                                          
15  See “Making a Difference” Beijing Review, 18 April, 2007, at 
<http://www.china.org.cn/english/MATERIAL/207808.htm > (downloaded 18 March 2010) 
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 NGOs have also worked at a ‘consciousness-raising’ level to develop 
workers awareness of their own rights, thereby raising social capital. SACOM 
emphasizes this type of role:   
 
“We believe that the most effective means of monitoring is to collaborate closely 
with workers at the workplace level. We team up with labor NGOs to provide in-
factory training to workers in South China. Through democratic elections, we 
support worker-based committees that can represent the voices of the majority of 
workers.”16 
 
Other NGOs have set up mobile education stations to help migrant 
workers improve their prospects of finding better jobs. Many have made good use 
of the internet and mobile phone technology to communicate with them as well as 
with each other.  
Overall, NGOs have shown ingenuity in developing further services 
beyond those described above, as required by their constituents. For example, 
Little Bird Hotline, the Institute of Contemporary Observation, Chinese Women 
Workers’ Network, Zhiqiang Migrant Labour Service Centre and the Panyu 
Worker Service Centre in Shenzhen all provide extensive counseling and medical 
advice. The ICO also conducts research into workers’ injuries, overtime, wages 
and living conditions (Greenwood-Bentley, 2004; He & Huang, 2008; Salmenkari, 
2009; Wang & Liu, 2009).  
 
GOVERNMENTAL REGULATION 
 
NGOs are perceived with suspicion by the state mainly for three reasons – first, 
they are regarded as a threat to the status quo, since the increasing influence of 
locally-based groups might create instability by becoming covers for those 
engaging in hostile political activities (Edele, 2005:12), and secondly, due to the 
presumption that there was little need for intermediaries between the state and the 
masses, except those designated by the state, such as the ACFTU (Greenwood-
Bentley, 2004). Third, the fact that many have foreign links increases state 
nervousness. 
Thus, the state tolerates NGOs’ existence but has a variety of measures to 
control them. An example is the Regulations on the Registration and Management 
of Social Organisations 1998.17 The regulatory requirements are onerous. The 
                                                          
16 Sacom.hk (downloaded 23 March, 2010) 
17 Published by the State Council at the 8
th 
ordinary session, September 25
th 
1998. See “China 
Development Brief”, at <http://www.chinadevelopmentbrief.com/node/298> (downloaded 1 May 
2009).  
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 first means of regulation is the formal registration procedure.  In order to obtain 
legal status, an NGO must be registered with the Ministry of Civil Affairs. To be 
registered, an NGO must first find a sponsor (usually a government authority 
carrying out work in a similar area). The sponsor is expected to exercise a 
supervisory role over the NGO, for example, by carrying out annual reviews, 
approving budgets and staffing plans. Predictably, very few organisations are able 
to register because they are unable to find a sponsor since to do so they need good 
connections with local officials. Additionally, the Regulations on the Registration 
and Management of Social Organisations (Article 13) state, “If in the same 
administrative area, there is already a social organisation active in the same or 
similar area of work, there is no need for a new organisation to be established”. 
Organisations which have not been able to register as NGOs often resort to 
registration as corporations – however, by doing so they attract higher tax 
liabilities and lower charitable donations (Wang & Liu, 2009: 27 – 30).  These 
researchers note (p. 29) that unregistered NGOs are ten times as numerous as 
registered. Further, NGOs are not allowed to operate outside the region in which 
they are registered. Since the competences of the Ministry of Civil Affairs 
departments are restricted to their respective regions, this condition is designed to 
prevent NGOs from spreading outside the departments’ sphere of influence. 
Given these difficulties, very many NGOs either avoid registration and operate 
illegally or register themselves as commercial enterprises or subsidiary 
organisations associated with universities.18   
The second, a crucial means of regulation is control of resources. In 
many cases, funding comes entirely from international donors such as the Ford 
Foundation, the Danish Institute for Human Rights and others since the majority 
of NGOs are not entitled to public funding. International funding is also set to be 
restricted by the Chinese government, evidently concerned by the wider 
international interest in their internal human rights affairs (Asia News, 2010). 
NGOs in China cannot rely on membership fees for funding, and enjoy very 
limited donations from philanthropic individuals or organisations (unless they are 
associated with the party state). Many NGOs cannot afford to employ full time 
employees and have to rely on either a small number of part time staff or 
volunteers (Edele, 2005: 24 – 25; Wang & Liu, 2009: 26 – 27). As a result, they 
are often small, lack influence, ineffectual and unable to extend the range of 
services they want to provide (Salmenkari, 2009). 
                                                          
18 Edele (2005) points out (at pgs.15-16) that non-registered NGOs cannot act as independent legal 
entities, which means that they cannot enter into contractual relations. It is also very difficult for 
them to attract qualified staff because they are not able to provide for basic social services for their 
employees, such as pension, medical insurance, and household registration. Finally, without 
registration an NGO cannot open its own bank account, which makes it difficult to attract funding.  
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 Third, the suppression of NGOs showing signs of developing 
independence has occurred. The state has been willing to tolerate NGOs working 
in areas such as environmental protection and social welfare provision, and indeed 
has begun to shift functions previously performed by itself to them. However, it 
has suppressed civil society organisations which promote a ‘rights awareness’ or 
which threaten to challenge its legitimacy. NGOs have expressed concern over the 
narrow field in which they are permitted to work, are critical of their relationship 
with the state and express frustration that operating within ambiguous political 
parameters has hindered their development in their fields and limited the 
discourse to those which are officially tolerated by the state (Beja, 2006; Liu, 
2006; Salmenkari, 2009: 406 – 408). Nevertheless, governmental attitudes 
(although ambivalent) may be shifting in a more positive direction, in particular 
toward NGOs which can help ameliorate social problems and social unrest 
(Greenwood-Bentley, 2004). It has been demonstrated, for example, that local 
government has recently proved more helpful in assisting them to register as legal 
NGOs (He & Huang, 2008).  They constitute significant competition for the 
ACFTU in an important representational arena and have already stimulated the 
official unions to make certain changes. 
 
CONCLUSION  
 
The first contribution of this article has been to show that neither increased social 
spending nor repression have been deployed in isolation against migrant workers’ 
self-activity, since attempts to reform the institutions of representation have also 
been significant within state policy. The second contribution has been to show the 
content of Chinese state activity: change within the official unions is encouraged 
not only by stimulating internal change, but also by permitting a limited degree of 
external competition. This in turn has provided activists with new sites of 
contestation in the legal sphere. The Chinese unions are bureaucratic, corporatist 
structures led by political appointees. It is arguable that the state, by continuing to 
tolerate NGOs functioning as legal representational and recreational organisations, 
is indirectly exerting pressure on unions to change. This competition has brought 
some benefit to migrant workers since from their viewpoint, the services of the 
ACFTU and NGOs are complementary in that their co-existence provides 
improved coverage.  In this way, the state can begin to integrate a separate 
segment of the working class into the mainstream, reducing its tendency to 
participate in social unrest.     
The emergence of competition, albeit in submerged and partial form, has 
broken the ACFTU’s previous monopoly on representation, an historic change of 
considerable symbolic importance since it shows that the régime may not be 
prepared unequivocally to maintain their exclusive rights. The competition in 
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 question is primarily for organisational utility to the state, i.e. to demonstrate 
effectiveness as acceptable channels for worker grievance handling.  
Organisational vehicles for diffusing discontent must balance credibility 
with both state and migrants since competition over the primary utility is related 
to a second, related one, for the allegiance of migrant workers. Obviously, the 
official unions are relatively politically reliable and it would clearly be preferable 
to the élite if they, rather than NGOs could be pushed towards embracing the new 
roles. But NGOs have organisational advantages in the second competition which 
is the precondition for success in diffusing discontent. First, those NGOs which 
originated from migrant workers enjoy spatial, social and experiential proximity 
to their constituency; they have constant contact with migrants. This is a 
significant organisational resource given the continuing consciousness of migrant 
workers that they constitute a separate group. Second, NGOs have shown 
considerable organisational flexibility and adaptability, proving persistent and 
innovative in defending migrant workers’ interests despite significant difficulties. 
These competitive advantages raise incentives for the ACFTU to reform. The 
sequence of innovation in representing migrant workers, whereby NGOs have led, 
the state has legislated and the official unions have responded, tends to suggest 
that competitive pressures have indeed had some effect on the official unions.  
Thus, the official unions now admit migrant workers within a neighbourhood 
structure which mirrors that of the NGOs. In addition, the ACFTU now has many 
local centres that borrow the community-based practices of the NGOs in offering 
legal advice and support to migrant workers. This demonstrates a certain reactive 
capacity on their part.   
The scope of competition does not extend across the whole range of 
union functions however, since NGOs, lacking a workplace presence, cannot 
carry out collective bargaining. But it is nevertheless extensive since it includes 
legal assistance, recreation and even to some extent political action. Moreover, 
collective bargaining in the Western sense has only a narrow base in the official 
unions. Yet the official unions’ strong tendency to adopt solutions that emphasise 
‘social harmony’ continues to pervade their organisational culture and daily 
practice, suggesting strict boundaries to likely future results.  Whether they can 
make a further transformation towards more genuinely representative bodies 
remains unclear. The state permits NGOs to operate both as a stimulus for them to 
attempt to do so and as a potential basis of alternative or complementary 
mechanisms should they fail. Thus, the state appears serious, albeit always within 
strict political limits, about encouraging representative institutions to develop.   
Our third contribution at the theoretical level has been on the nature of 
Chinese corporatism.  In terms of the debate on how far if at all the Chinese 
situation is moving towards a ‘societal’ rather than a ‘state’ form of corporatism, 
our analysis broadly supports the view that the former is indeed arising. It is clear 
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 that it is developments at the base of society that have driven the Chinese form of 
corporatism.  Whilst the Chinese state is clearly hesitant and reserved in allowing 
institutions to develop at this level, it has also felt compelled to recognise that 
some such development is in fact required.  All such judgements must clearly be 
provisional in the context, but the state has established a competitive dynamic 
between official unions and NGOs. In so doing, it raises incentives for both to 
adopt increasingly representative roles.    
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